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I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s remarkable economic growth in recent decades, 
despite poorly defined property rights and a relatively weak legal 
system, is a puzzle to the general literature of law, finance, and 
development.  China’s courts are rather weak and the judges are 
not well trained.1  The number of attorneys practicing in China is 
relatively low compared to other jurisdictions.2  China also 
performs far below other countries in terms of creditor rights, 
shareholder protection, and corruption safeguards.3  These facts 
present the quandary: How has China achieved such notable 
 
       †   Xiabo Zhang is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Food Policy 
Research Institute.  The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments 
from Wei Chen, Shenggen Fan, and Xiaopeng Luo and research assistance from 
Kiran Gajwani. 
 1. See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The 
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2, 10 (1996) (explaining that 
there is a low execution rate for judicial cases and that court officials are poorly 
educated).  
 2. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic 
Growth in China, 9 (Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper No. 02-
44, 2002) (stating that there are 150,000 attorneys in China, which is roughly the 
same number of licensed attorneys as in the state of California). 
 3. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (sampling various 
countries to assess creditor rights, shareholder protections, and corruption). 
1
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economic growth? 
There is a broad consensus within economic literature that 
institutions such as property rights are important to economic 
growth.4  Economic scholars have studied the role and importance 
of property rights in economic growth.5  Further, empirical studies 
emphasize the importance of state institutions.  Recent cross-
country data shows that the presence of a legal system matters to 
economic growth and financial systems.6  Analysis arising out of this 
data reveals that a common-law system consistently outperforms the 
civil-law system in providing protection to minority shareholders, 
thereby facilitating dispersed ownership and economic growth.7  
Property rights and the rule of law are some of the most important 
aspects of good governance, and their countering effect on poverty 
may even be stronger than the effects of democracy.8 
In developing and transitioning countries, a lack of well-
defined property rights and formal legal systems is the norm rather 
than the exception.9  When formal institutions are lacking, societies 
may attempt to evolve along with their alternative systems to 
protect their economic activities.10  Case studies show that social 
arrangements can be as important as State institutions in their 
ability to affect economic growth.11  The economic impact of 
societal arrangements is demonstrated by the rapid growth of the 
township and village enterprises (TVE) in China during the 1980s 
and 1990s.12  Although the TVE does not have clearly defined 
 
 4. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (arguing that secure property rights are a 
necessary condition for economic development). 
 5. See Janine Aron, Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence, 15  WORLD 
BANK RES. OBSERVER 99 (2000) (containing a general overview of the empirical 
work completed on the importance of institutions to economic growth, as well as a 
review of different ways to proxy for measures of institutional quality). 
 6. La Porta et al., supra note 3. 
 7. Id. at 1132. 
 8. David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Property Rights, Political Rights, and the 
Development of Poor Countries in the Post-Colonial Period, ECONOMIC HISTORY 
ASSOCIATION, 2000, http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/Logistics/eha_abstracts_fall 
_2000.html. 
 9. See Marcel Fafchamps & Bart Minten, Property Rights in a Flea Market 
Economy, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 229 (2001) (utilizing Madagascar as a 
case study to examine property rights).  
 10. See id. at 251 (discussing alternative contract enforcement methods where 
formal institutions fail to offer protections).  
 11. IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
(Dani Rodrik ed., 2003) [hereinafter IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY]. 
 12. YINGYI QIAN, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY, 
2
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property rights, the sector has achieved remarkable growth.13 
The lack of formal property right protections in China causes a 
high level of uncertainty associated with business engagements.14  
As a result, the transaction costs associated with writing a complete 
contract are often prohibitive.  But even ambiguous property rights 
within the TVE can offer a certain level of economic security.15  In 
fact, high transaction costs provide an environment where 
ambiguous property rights can be more efficient than well-defined 
property rights.  In this context, ambiguous property rights in a 
TVE may be a better option for business arrangements. 
Local officials often act as shareholders of a TVE.16  Thus, 
business endeavors can secure protections from the local 
government and reduce impediments to reform at the local level.  
In the absence of an impartial third party to enforce contracts, 
entrepreneurs may receive better protection by teaming up with 
local officials as opposed to operating as purely private enterprises 
that are forced to rely on China’s ill-functioning formal legal 
system.17  China’s experience shows that growth can still take place 
amidst less clearly defined property rights.  Various social 
arrangements may provide necessary, alternative forms of 
protection for property rights to underpin economic activities.18 
 
supra note 11, at 306;  BEN CARVER ET AL., RENEWABLE LIGHTING FOR THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD (2003), http://cee45q.stanford.edu/2003/briefing_book/ 
china.html#s4.1 (explaining that TVEs are defined as “rural, non-agricultural, 
non-State enterprises that are collectively or privately owned” and are “analogous 
to a corporation owned and managed by the local township or village”). 
 13. QIAN, supra note 12.  
 14. Id. 
 15. David D. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: 
The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 15–16 (1996). 
 16. See Laixiang Sun, Fading Out of Local Government Ownership: Recent 
Ownership Reform in China’s Township and Village Enterprises, 26 ECON. SYSTEMS  249 
(2002) (explaining that local government ownership has dominated China’s 
township and village enterprises). 
 17. Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership 
of Firms, 113 Q. J. ECON. 467 (1998). 
 18. Although there is a large body of literature addressing how land tenure 
arrangements affect agricultural investment and rural welfare in China, studies on 
the impact of land property rights on industrial development are more limited.  
For a discussion of land tenure arrangements see Hannan Jacoby, Guo Li & Scott 
Rozelle, Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China, 92 
AM. ECON. REV. 1420 (2002); James Kai-sing Kung, Choice of Land Tenure in China, 
50 ECON. DEV. &  CULTURAL CHANGE 793, 795–98 (2002); Kalus Deininger & 
Songqing Jin, Impact of Property Rights on Households, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL 
CHANGE 851 (2003). 
3
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But the ambiguous property rights offered by social 
arrangements are not sufficient to explain why China has grown 
faster than many other societies with better-defined property rights.  
Apart from the property rights argument, there is a large body of 
literature examining other sources for economic growth in China, 
including market-preserving federalism,19 the release of high 
quality human capital seeded in the planning era,20 the functioning 
informal finance market,21 substantial total factor productivity 
growth due to the high level of human capital,22 realigning of 
comparative advantages in development strategy,23 increased input 
use,24 and resource reallocation in the economic transition.25  As 
economic growth ultimately results from the accumulation of many 
factors, the above list is far from exhaustive. 
The nature of China’s property rights arrangement has not 
been sufficiently uncovered to explain its remarkable growth 
patterns.  This paper extends the list of factors affecting China’s 
economic growth to include the diverging degrees of property 
rights protections held by investors as opposed to individuals.  This 
consideration has largely been under-researched and is generally 
not well understood by Western observers of China’s economy.   
The next section reviews the regional property rights 
hypothesis in China and explores the de jure26 and de facto27 
property rights that are present in China.28  Section III highlights 
the divergence between investor property rights and individual 
property rights, which contribute to an understanding of the 
 
 19. See, e.g., Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget 
Constraint, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1143 (1998) (discussing federalism in China’s 
economic growth generally). 
 20. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 143, 143–45 (1999). 
 21. Allen et al., supra note 2, at 9. 
 22. See Gregory C. Chow & Kui-Wai Li, China’s Economic Growth: 1952–2010, 51 
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 247 (2002). 
 23. See Justin Yifu Lin, Development Strategy, Viability, and Economic Convergence, 
51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 277 (2003). 
 24. See Alwyn Young, Gold into Base Metals: Productivity Growth in the People’s 
Republic of China During the Reform Period, 11 J. POL. ECON. 1220 (2003). 
 25. Shenggen Fan, Xiaobo Zhang & Sherman Robinson, Structural Change and 
Economic Growth in China, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 360 (2003). 
 26. De jure rights exist by right or according to law.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
458 (8th ed. 2004). 
 27. De facto rights exist in fact and have effect even though they are not 
formally or legally recognized.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004). 
 28. See infra Part II. 
4
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nature of Chinese economic growth.29  Section IV stresses the 
negative consequence of this growth mode.30  Finally, Section V 
concludes with a discussion of the internal conflict between China’s 
economic growth and the deprivation of individual property 
rights.31 
II. REGIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Historically, scholars have focused on the sovereign, national 
level in assessing property rights.32  But in China, the protections 
provided at the local level may matter more.  China lacks clearly 
defined, formal property rights and the accompanying legal system 
required for their enforcement on the national level.33  Thus, the 
country lacks a purely de jure property rights system. 
The regional property hypothesis suggests that it is possible for 
growth to take place under China’s current institutional 
arrangements.34  This hypothesis underlines the importance of the 
de facto property rights offered at the regional level and suggests 
that they function as substitutes for weak, formal property rights.  
De facto property rights partly satisfy investor demands by 
providing adequate protections.35  Investors benefit from the 
 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See infra Part V. 
 32. Robert H. Bates, On The Politics of Property Rights by Harber, Razo, and 
Maurer, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 494, 497 (2004) (book review) (“In viewing 
property rights, scholars have, along with Hobbes, referred to sovereigns; that is, 
they have focused on the national level.”). 
 33. See supra Part I. 
 34. See Xiaobo Zhang & Kevin H. Zhang, How Does Globalization Affect Regional 
Inequality Within a Developing Country? Evidence from China, 39 J. DEV. STUD. 47, 49–
51 (2003).  Between 1978 and 1998, real gross domestic product grew 9.63% in 
China.  Id. at 50. 
 35. See Dani Rodrik, Getting Institutions Right, Apr. 2004, http://ksghome.har 
vard.edu/~drodrik/ifo-institutions%20article%20_April%202004.pdf (explaining 
that although China has no formal property protections, investors seemingly felt 
more protected than in Russia, which does have formal property protections).  
Rodrik articulates the view that legal institutions themselves do not really matter 
for growth, rather it is the investors’ perceptions regarding the safety of their 
property rights that really count.  Id.  He compares China’s “poor” legal property 
rights to Russia’s “good” legal property rights, and finds that China has succeeded 
in business growth while Russia has not.  Id. at 7.  Rodrik concludes that the 
disparity is due to the success of China’s TVE and their sharing of profits with local 
governments, which assures owners that the government will not take their land 
away despite a lack of property rights.  Id. at 8–9. 
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implicit instrumental protections offered by local governments.36 
The order, stability, and predictability that local governments 
provide are important ingredients to a de facto property rights 
system.  The hierarchical structure of China’s local governments 
secures property rights at the local level.37  Fiscal decentralization 
combined with mobile capital results in a hard budget constraint 
for local governments and prevents them from bailing out failing 
state-owned enterprises.38  Under fiscal decentralization, local 
governments are responsible for raising revenues to provide most 
local public goods and services.39  Consequently, local governments 
have an interest in promoting the growth of the TVE because it is a 
major source of local revenues.40  In this regard, the interests of the 
TVE and local governments are closely attuned to each other.  
Although the ownership of a TVE is not standard, they work well in 
an environment where formal protections of private property rights 
are not in place.41 
Local governments also actively compete for foreign direct 
investment (FDI).42  This competition leads local governments to 
vigorously pursue the creation of a business-friendly investment 
environment.  Common practices include establishing special 
zones, granting favorable tax breaks, and allowing free use of land 
for a certain period of time.43  With China’s opening up to the 
global market, FDI has become one of the key drivers of economic 
 
 36. Id. at 7–9. 
 37. DAVID GRANICK, CHINESE STATE ENTERPRISES: A REGIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ANALYSIS (1990). Others have traced secure regional property rights to inter-
judiciary competition.  See Xiaopeng Luo, Regional Competition and Property Rights: 
The Logic of Chinese Economic Reform, 2 MODERN CHINA RES. 1 (1995). 
 38. Qian & Roland, supra note 19, at 1144 (explaining that “competition 
among local governments in attracting capital to their region creates an 
externality which increases the opportunity cost of subsidizing inefficient 
enterprises, which in turn reduces the incentives for bailouts”). 
 39. See World Bank Group, Decentralization and Subnational Regional Economics, 
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscal.htm (explaining 
that decentralized functions require local governments to raise adequate levels of 
revenue). 
 40. BEN CARVER ET AL., supra note 12 (commenting that a primary objective of 
the TVE is to increase local revenues). 
 41. Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY, 
supra note 11, at 297. 
 42. See Li, supra note 15, at 6 (stating that local officials are promoted to 
higher ranks when the local economy excels). 
 43. See Symposium, The Role of Incentives in Foreign Direct Investment, 23 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 612–15 (2001). 
6
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growth.44   
Even without a well-defined de jure property rights system, 
China ranks the highest in terms of investor satisfaction with 
regulatory interpretations and confidence in the judicial system as 
shown in Table 1.45  Thus, preliminary evidence illustrates a chasm 
between China’s potential for economic growth and the necessity 
of a de jure property rights system.  Yet the regional property 
hypothesis is not sufficient to explain why the current system of de 
facto property rights should perform better in China than the well-
functioning de jure and de facto rights that exist in many other 
countries.  Functionally, the regional property rights hypothesis 
explains the similarities between China’s de facto property rights 
and the de jure property rights in other countries, showing that the 
system in China could work. But the hypothesis does not explain 
why China performs so well compared to many other countries that 
have both a formal property rights system and a functioning legal 
system.  Certainly, there could be other reasons why China has 
outperformed many other developing countries.46  This paper 
focuses on the question through the lens of property rights. 
III.  UNBALANCED INVESTOR AND INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
An examination of the bargaining costs associated with formal 
property rights and legal systems provides a basis for understanding 
China’s strong economic growth.  The procurement of land 
through a formalized property rights system entails certain 
negotiation and bargaining costs.47  Large decisions like land 
procurement go through a long procedure of negotiations, 
 
 44. See Zhang, supra note 34, at 49–51. Foreign direct investment generates 
local revenues through taxes and fees.  Foreign investment also provides “new 
technology, managerial skill, and training for labor.”  GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 305 (2002). 
 45. World Bank Group, Investment Climate Survey Online (2005), http:// 
iresearch.worldbank.org/ics/jsp/index.jsp. 
 46. See supra Part I (listing a series of explanations for China’s economic 
growth). 
 47. See NORTH, supra note 4.  But see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).  R. H. Coase maintains that if property rights are well 
defined and the parties can negotiate free of cost, then economic agents can 
resolve conflicts through bargaining to achieve an efficient outcome.  Id.  But 
efficient bargaining under Coase’s theory can be difficult to achieve in the 
political economy domain due to a lack of commitment.  See Daron Acemoglu, 
Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. 
ECON., 620, 622–23, 633–38 (2003). 
7
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bargaining, and hearings involving relevant interest groups.48  
China’s informal, de facto property rights system allows the 
government and investors to largely avoid these bargaining costs 
and procedures, thereby promoting investments and economic 
growth. 
In democratic countries, it often takes years for different 
interest groups to reach an agreement on land acquisition.49  
Interest groups provide a system of checks and balances for one 
another.  This prolonged negotiation process impedes the speed of 
both public and private business investments.  In this context, 
democratic regimes can be rather rigid to reforms because certain 
interest groups can effectively block and prolong any significant 
changes, even when the changes may be good for the society as a 
whole.50  Thus, the functioning of well-defined property rights 
entails significant negotiation costs. 
In contrast, an authoritarian regime may have certain 
advantages in prompting growth when its decisions are in line with 
the public interest.51  Under an authoritarian regime, it may be 
easier to complete land transactions because of reduced efforts to 
balance conflicting interests held by interest groups.52  As a result, 
an authoritarian regime is likely to create a more business-friendly 
investment environment. 
The negotiation costs for land procurement in China are 
much lower than in many other countries with well-defined 
property rights.  Lower negotiation costs arise from China’s unique 
practice of recognizing varying degrees of property rights 
 
 48. See NORTH, supra note 4.    
 49. See PMC Land Acquisition Moves at Snail’s Pace, TIMES OF INDIA, Nov. 4, 2004 
(discussing India’s administrative and governmental delays in land acquisition). 
 50. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND ECONOMIC RIGIDITIES 57 (1982) (“After taking the time 
needed to arrive at their own decisions, cartels and lobbies sometimes then need 
more time to deal with their partners and antagonists . . . . The lobbying 
organization must, besides agreeing on its own policies, go through the 
compromises and procedures needed to change government policy.  All this 
makes decision-making still slower.”). 
 51. SEN, supra note 20, at 149.  But when the authoritarian regime makes 
mistakes, sometimes the consequences can be disastrous, like the Great Famine in 
China.  Id. at 150.  Without enough checks and balances, the likelihood of making 
unforgivable mistakes is higher than in democratic regimes.  Id. 
 52. See Jennifer Windsor, Democracy and Development: The Evolution of U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Policy, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 141 (2003) (suggesting the 
argument that authoritarian regimes are better able to utilize scarce resources and 
create economic growth). 
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attributable to investors as opposed to individuals.  China provides 
effective protections for capital investments in many regions in 
spite of the absence of well-defined, formal property rights and 
legal systems.53  But the property rights of individuals, including 
workers and farmers, are more loosely defined. 
According to Article 10 of China’s 1982 Constitution, the State 
owns the land in cities, while land in rural and suburban areas 
belongs to the collectives—except the land which already has been 
defined as State-owned.54  In other words, Chinese law prohibits 
private land ownership. 55  Yet individuals are allowed to possess the 
user rights, which are separated from the ownership right.56  These 
long-term land user rights can be sold, rented, and used as 
collateral.57  The contract term of land-use rights for housing can 
last up to seventy years, and land-use rights for industrial, public, 
and commercial purposes can last up to fifty years.58  Nominally, the 
State cannot take the land away within the contract term except 
under special circumstances when the land is reclassified for public 
use.59 
There are at least three ambiguities in the law.  First, the 
definition of public interest is rather vague.  For example, 
universities in general are considered public although they charge 
high tuition fees and operate like a commercial entity.60  In recent 
 
 53. See supra Part II.  Although investors lack the formal protection of courts 
and other legal systems to secure their property rights, some indigenous 
institutional arrangements can provide functional and feasible substitutes. See John 
C. Cofee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 77 (2001) (“The point here is 
not that law does not matter, but that partial functional substitutes for formal legal 
requirements are both feasible and spreading.”). 
 54. XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
 55. Down on the Farm: A Rural Crisis Is Forcing Beijing to Reconsider the Idea of 
Private Property, NEWSWEEK INT’L, May 15, 2006 (acknowledging that China “still 
lacks private-property rights” and that “Chinese cannot legally own land”). 
 56. See XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.) (amended 1988) (“[N]o organization 
or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land 
by unlawful means.  The right to the use of land may be transferred according to 
law.”).  
 57. Benjamin Robertson, China: Selling Out the Family Farm, FAR E. ECON. REV., 
Oct. 26, 2005, at 48–51. 
 58. Stephen Wong, Chinese Fear Homes Are Castles in the Air, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, 
Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HJ03Cb01.html. 
 59. See T. Oliver Yee, A Bid For a New Future: What Are the Effects and Challenges 
of the New National Public Bidding Regulations on Land Use Rights Assignment in 
China?, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 448–49 (2005). 
 60. The Langfang Dongfang University town presents an example of how 
9
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land is initially procured under the guise of “public use,” but quickly transforms 
into a commercial enterprise.  Langfang City belongs to Hebei Province, but is 
located right between Beijing and Tianjin, the two largest cities in northern China.  
Langfang, CHINA DAILY, July 16, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/ 
doc/2004-07/16/content_349131.htm. In order to take advantage of its 
geographical location, and in response to a campaign to turn high education into 
an industry, the Langfang Economic Development Zone decided to build the 
largest university town in China.  Cf. Shi Jiangtao, Cadres Disciplined Over University 
Land Scam, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at 12 (explaining that 
Langfang became one of fifty-four cities to develop universities in response to the 
central government’s education expansion plan).  With the nationwide zeal of 
turning universities into enterprises, Langfang City expected to use the land as a 
bait to attract investors to build in the town.  See Pamela Pun, University Housing 
Scam Exposed, STANDARD (China), at A01, translated in WISENEWS, available at 
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~cstafrep/wnews/wisenews040527.html.  Cf., Jiangtao 
(stating that many university plans “turned out to be commercial property 
developments”). 
  As a signature project, the university-town project easily obtained a permit 
acquiring 5,728 mu of farmland for public use.  See Big Problems with Some Chinese 
College Cities, Official, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (China), July 1, 2004, http://english. 
peopledaily.com.cn/200407/01/eng20040701_148143.html (stating that arable 
land was obtained through illegally signed land contracts).  The university town 
paid farmers 55,000 yuan per mu in accord with the official price of land for 
public use. See Illegal Land Acquisition in Dongfang University Town, PEOPLE (China),  
Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2342990.html.  But 
the market value of the land was eventually estimated at 300,000 yuan per mu.  Id.  
The land was inevitably used for commercial purposes, building commercial 
apartment buildings, villas, stores, and golf courses.  See  Jiangtao; see also A 
Disturbingly Luxurious Golf Course, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http://www.people.com. 
cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2347970.html.   
  The university town did not need to contribute much money in advance. 
Yang Bo & Du Zhen, The Alarming Debt Black Hole, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http:// 
www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2340954.html.  The bidding construction 
companies were required to self-finance for the first three years before receiving a 
payment by the fourth year.  Id.  But the actual enrollment turned out to be far 
lower than expected.  See Chan Siu-sin, University Town Gets Blasted by Auditor: 
Developments Bypassed State Council Land-Use Approval and Abused Credit, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, June 2, 2005, at 4 (stating that loans may not be repaid because 
student enrollment remained lower than expected).  By the end of 2003, the 
university town had to default on its payments to the construction companies, who 
in turn defaulted on their loans to the banks and put workers’ wages in arrears.  
Yang Bo & Du Zhen, The Alarming Debt Black Hole, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http:// 
www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2340954.html.  The crisis was not exposed 
to the media until one of the contractors took sleeping pills in an attempt to 
commit suicide in front of the university town managers and city leaders in protest 
of the overdue payments.  See Su Wei, No Way to Get Paid: University City in Langfang 
Stuck in Deficit, BEIJING TODAY, Apr. 2, 2002, http://bjtoday.ynet.com/article.jsp? 
oid=2949742&pageno=1.  His life was saved and his brave behavior helped his 
workers get some of their wages in arrear.  Id.  For additional insight into the 
Langfang Dongfang University see Shockingly Illegal Land Acquisitions, PEOPLE 
(China), 2004 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2342990.html; The 
Secrets of Instantly Gaining Wealth, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http://www.people.com. 
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years, many universities have expanded their campuses.61  By 
labeling the land in the interest of the public, the universities can 
obtain land-use permits, which allow them to acquire land from 
farmers at a much lower price than for commercial purposes.62 
Second, the law does not specify, in detail, how to compensate 
those being deprived of land.  It loosely states that developers 
should grant a certain amount of compensation based on the years 
of actual use by the farmers in the land and the land development 
situation.63 
Third, the law does not stipulate a relationship between 
collectives and peasants for rural land.  In rural areas, collectives 
refer to villages where a village committee normally exercises 
executive power.64  Therefore, in reality, local governments only 
need to deal with the village committee during the land 
procurement process.  In bypassing farmers, the local governments 
and developers can significantly reduce the negotiation cost.  
Sometimes, they collude to extract as much rent as possible from 
farmers’ land.65  To a large extent, farmers do not have much voice 
in the land procurement process.66  They are rarely informed of the 
purpose of land procurement or the terms of compensation until 
the arrangements are finalized and officially announced.67  
Moreover, individuals usually must vacate their house or property 
 
cn/GB/jiaoyu /1054/2345093.html. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (P.R.C.) (amended 2004) (“The State may, in 
the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private 
property for its use and shall make compensation for the private property 
expropriated or requisitioned.”). 
 64. See Farmers to Choose New Villagers’ Committees, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 21, 2005 
(explaining that a villagers’ committee is a governmental organization that 
manages the village’s affairs). 
 65. See Xiaokai Yang, Theories of Property Rights and China’s Reforms, 4 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 195, 207 (1993) (stating that local governments attempt to assist 
investment firms).  This agency-like relationship can be seen as a “positive 
development because the local governments are strongly geared to assist 
development of local firms instead of making troubles for them.  On the other 
hand, of course, this generates rampant corruption.”  Id. 
 66. Mark Magnier, Land Grabs Pit Farmers Against Developers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
19, 2006 (expressing farmers’ resentment over the lack of hearings and 
opportunities to negotiate fair land prices and further describing their protests 
against land grabs).  
 67. See Farmland in Capital Illegally Cleared for Golf Course, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, July 9, 2000, at 9 (explaining that farmers were not consulted before a 
tourism board signed an agreement renting their land for use as a golf course). 
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on the land under a short notice, otherwise the state can use force 
to demolish the property by exercising the power of law.68 
The ambiguities inherent in China’s current laws allows 
developers and local governments to acquire a land-use permit for 
developments in the public interest but then develop some of the 
land for commercial purposes.  This creates a strong incentive for 
local governments to grab land.  This is why there has been a 
nationwide “development zone fever” and “real estate fever” since 
Xiaoping Deng called for more “openness” during his famous tour 
in the South in 1992.69  The current political environment allows 
these so-called development zones to easily be labeled as in the 
public interest. 
Strong regional protection for investors’ rights together with a 
weak protection of individual rights lowers the cost of doing 
business.  In turn, the process of land procurement is eased and 
local governments economically prosper.  Land is an important 
source of local revenues.70  With increasing industrialization and 
urbanization, the demand for land drives up land values.71  
Although severe competition for mobile capital restrains local 
governments from over-taxing the industrial sector, land values 
nonetheless create a source of income for local governments.  The 
more development there is in a region, the higher land price 
becomes and the more local governments come to rely on land for 
local revenues.  Naturally, land becomes a target of revenue for 
local governments.72  Figure 1 reveals a clear positive correlation 
 
 68. See Eviction Was Belated for Project in China, SEATTLE TIMES (Wash.), June 9, 
2006, at A2 (commenting on a building commission’s eviction and demolition 
orders). 
 69. John Gittings, Phoney Deals of 'Development Fever' Take Toll, GUARDIAN 
(London), June 23, 1998, at 20; New Rules Aim to Cool Development Zone Fever, CHINA 
DAILY, June 12, 1995, at 1; Kent Chen, Development Zones ‘Wasteful,’ S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, March 30, 1993; Taiwan Paper Publishes ‘Gist’ of Deng Xiaoping’s 
Classified Speech on Reform, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP., March 11, 1992. 
 70. See Chengri Ding, Effects of Land Acquisition on China’s Economic Future, 
LAND LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Cambridge, MA), Jan. 2004, 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid=872 (stating that a local 
government’s revenue-raising capability is rooted in China’s land ownership 
structure).  
 71. See Xiaobo Zhang, Timothy D. Mount & Richard N. Boisvert, 
Industrialization, Urbanization, and Land Use in China, (Int’l Food Policy Research 
Inst., Environment and Prod. Tech. Div., Discussion Paper No. 58, 2000) 
(explaining that industrialization and urbanization increase land scarcity). 
 72. See Ding, supra note 70. 
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between land revenues and economic development.73  In addition 
to being a revenue source, local governments also use land as an 
instrument to acquire loans to finance infrastructure 
development.74  Once land is acquired, local governments and 
developers can then use the State-owned land as collateral to 
directly seek credit from State banks.75   
The inequitable distribution of security between investor and 
individual property rights represents a unique feature of China’s 
property-rights system.  On the one hand, local governments 
provide strong protection for business investment, particularly in 
regions with a large FDI presence.76  The highly conducive 
investment climate and strong de facto property rights help to 
explain how China has managed to grow so fast.77  Table 2 
compares China with its peers and provides strong evidence of an 
exceptionally conducive investment climate in China.78  On the 
other hand, local governments take advantage of the loopholes in 
the law to seize land from farmers without sufficient 
 
 73. CHINA STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA COUNTY PUBLIC FINANCE 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2001). 
 74. WORLD BANK, CHINA: LAND POLICY REFORM FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (2005). 
 75. Swati Lodh Kundu, Rural China: Too Little, Too Late, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, 
July 19, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HG19Cb01.html 
(explaining that the State uses requisitioned land as collateral for bank loans). 
 76. See supra Part II. 
 77. In the past, China and India had similar levels of economic growth.  See S. 
Venkitaramanan, Two Emerging Giants: The Global Debate, BUS. LINE (Hindu), May 9, 
2005 (“In the 1970s when the two countries started growing, their gross domestic 
product per head at common international prices were broadly similar.”).  But 
China’s economic growth in recent years has far exceeded India’s own economic 
growth.  Kevin Rafferty, India Fails to Realize its Democratic Advantage, GULF NEWS, 
Sept. 23, 2003.  Subsidies in India vividly illustrate how a country with formal 
institutions can be hampered by its own internal policies.  ASHOK GULATI & SUDHA 
NARAYANAN, SUBSIDY SYNDROME IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE 90 (2003).   Electricity is 
free or subsidized.  Id.  Consequently, farmers tend to over-consume the 
electricity, thereby contributing to an overstressed power system and frequent 
power outages in many rural areas.  Id. at 90–91.  Although politicians are fully 
aware of the problem, few dare to propose a change in policy for fear of losing the 
popular support of farmers.  Id. at 122–36.  Power outages take a toll on the 
growth of India’s economy.  David Dollar, Mary Hallward-Driemeier & Taye 
Mengistae, Investment Climate and Firm Performance, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL 
CHANGE 1 (2005); India’s Electricity Reforms: Underpowering, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 
2005, at 83–84.  The problem of inadequate infrastructure more than offsets 
India’s advantage in having a well-defined property rights system.  Id. 
 78. World Bank Group, Doing Business: Comparing Business Regulations, 2006, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org (providing insight into the investment climates of 
China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines).  
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compensation.79 
IV.   LAND RIGHTS: FUEL OF GROWTH AND VOLCANO OF SOCIAL 
CONFLICT 
Easy access to land facilitates capital investment, which in turn 
prompts industrial growth.  About one-fourth of China’s dramatic 
economic growth in recent decades stems from capital 
accumulation.80  Table 3 shows that the growth rate of fixed asset 
investment in China is over five percent higher than the growth 
rate of per capita consumption, indicating that the pace of fixed-
asset investment significantly exceeded the rate of per capita 
consumption.81 
Fierce regional competition encourages local governments to 
seek credit to develop their local economy.  Before 1994, it was 
common practice for local governments to force banks in their 
jurisdiction to extend them credit, creating serious inflation in the 
early 1990s.82  Since 1994, however, the central government has 
 
 79. Jim Yardley, The Great Divide: Suddenly Landless Farmers Being Moved Aside By 
China’s Real Estate Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1.  Weak individual rights 
also apply to workers.  For example, migratory workers do not have access to 
education, healthcare, and jobs. Sarah Carr, Millions of Migrant Workers Moved to 
Chinese Cities Seeking Opportunity, but Their Children Are Falling Through the Cracks of 
the Education System, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Wis.), Jan. 4, 2007, at A1.  With cheap 
labor and land, generous tax breaks, good infrastructure, and a predictable 
investment environment, it is not surprising that China attracts considerable 
foreign direct investment. 
 80. Shenggen Fan, Xiaobo Zhang & Sherman Robinson, Structural Change and 
Economic Growth in China, 7 REV.  DEV. ECON. 360, 374 (2003). 
 81. Per capita consumption and fixed asset investment data is from the China 
Statistical Yearbook.  CHINA STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK (2004).  See also Xiaobo Zhang & Kong-Yam Tan, Blunt to Sharpened 
Razor: Incremental Reform and Distortions in the Product and Capital Markets in China,  
(Int’l Food Policy Research Inst., Dev. Strategy and Governance Div., Discussion 
Paper No. 13, 2004) (discussing, in detail, the causes of discrepancy between 
consumption and investment data in GDP statistics).  Jinstin Yifu Lin attributes 
China’s deflation from 1998 to 2002 to excessive production capacity, which was 
caused by the overwhelming expansion of fixed asset investment in relation to 
income growth.  Jinstin Yifu Lin, Is China’s Growth Real and Sustainable?, 12 (China 
Center for Economic Research, Peking University, Working Paper No. E2004003, 
2004).  Lin, however, does not offer any further explanation as to why the growth 
of fixed asset investments surpasses consumption by so much. 
 82. See Ya-Hwei, Development and Financial Problems in China’s Financial System, 
2004, http://www.tsc.nccu.edu.tw/2004conference/%B7%A8%B6%AE%B4f.pdf 
(stating that China’s financial system “has been under full government control 
[for many years], where the government alone decided which direction private 
funds should go” and that since 1988, the economy has suffered from inflation 
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reasserted its control over the banks and has separated bank 
branches from local governments.83  But despite an initial slow-
down, the growth rate of fixed-asset investment has accelerated.84  
Theoretically, if the monetary authority is centralized, fiscal 
decentralization should not lead to credit expansion.85  But why 
then did fixed-asset investment increase rather than slow down in 
China after the separation of bank branches from local 
governments in 1994?  The answer is related to land banking. 
The ambiguous law on land use gave local governments leeway 
in obtaining land-use permits within their locality.  Having received 
a land-use permit, local governments can easily procure land from 
farmers at a low price and turn the ownership from collectives over 
to the State.86  Local governments could continue obtaining credit 
from State banks even after bank branches were separated from 
local governments in 1994.87  Nominally centralized monetary 
systems still have loopholes.88  Functionally speaking, the monetary 
system is not independent from the land grabs of local 
governments.  This theory helps explain why the current interest 
rate policy is not sufficient to cool down the demand for fixed asset 
investment. 
Despite the benefits of growth, the current land fever also has 
negative consequences.  Nearly thirty-four million mu of farmland 
were converted to urban and industrial development from 1987 to 
2001, and about thirty-four million farmers lost land.89  The 
Ministry of Land and Resources reported that “China’s cultivated 
land is dwindling owing to construction recently, leading to a 
serious contradiction between land and population.”90  The 
 
due to overheating). 
 83. Id. (explaining that in 1994, the government established “national policy 
banks to be in charge of policy-oriented financial business”).   
 84.  China’s Economy Slows but Still Grows 8.5 Percent, PAC. SHIPPER, Apr. 20, 
2006. 
 85. See Qian & Roland, supra note 19. 
 86. The Langfang University Town experience provides a vivid example on 
the mechanism of land grabs.  See supra note 60.   
 87. See Ya-Hwei, supra note 82 (commenting that local governments still enjoy 
wide discretion in administrative decisions).    
 88. The arguments here do not invalidate the insights of Yingyi Qian and 
Gerard Roland on the role of an independent monetary system.  
 89. Han Jun, Jiang Tudi Nongmin Jiti Suyou Dingjie Wei An Gufen Gongyouzhi 
[Change Collective Land Ownership into Shareholder Ownership], Zhongguo Jingji 
Shibao [CHINA ECON. TIMES], Nov. 11, 2003 [hereinafter Change Collective Land 
Ownership]. One mu is equivalent to one-sixth of an acre.  Yardley, supra note 79.  
 90. Ministry of Land and Resources, Some Facts About the Land and Resources of 
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compensation received by farmers accounts for only a fraction of 
the total market value.91  Clearly, local governments and developers 
appropriate a large fraction of the land rent. 
Aside from paying low compensation for land acquisitions, 
local governments and developers often provoke additional 
outrage by using the land for commercial purposes in violation of 
the original public purpose intent.92  When facing unfair 
compensation and broken promises, individuals can, in principle, 
file a lawsuit with the courts.  But the local courts rarely take cases 
pertaining to local government.93  As a result, aggrieved individuals 
often end up having to appeal to the county-level government, 
provincial party leadership, central government, the media, or 
whoever else will listen to them.  This may be why the Ministry of 
Construction received three times as many complaints about land 
disputes in the first quarter of 2004 as in the same period during 
2003.94  According to their statistics, by the end of June, 4,000 
groups and 18,600 individuals had lodged petitions over allegedly 
illicit land confiscations.95  Another recent study also shows that 
land disputes top the list of farmer petitions, accounting for 
approximately sixty-three percent of total complaint letters.96 
A dramatic increase in the number of media reports on 
corruption within the banking and real estate sectors also 
 
China, 2007, http://www.mlr.gov.cn/pub/gtzyb/mlrenglish/facts/index.htm. 
 91. Change Collective Land Ownership, supra note 89;  see also Yardley, supra note 
76 (explaining that local officials offered farmers sixty dollars per mu for Xisha 
land and then leased the same land to developers for fifty times that amount).  
 92. During land grabs, tension rises to the point of riots and protests between 
farmers and local governments.  See Yardley, supra note 79 (“Riots and protests 
over land seizures and inadequate compensation have erupted across China for 
much of this year.”). 
 93. See Housing Disparity Highlights Need for Even Playing Field, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 2006, at 2 (discussing social land conflicts, stating that the 
resolution to such conflicts in China will be “brutal” because “[i]n other countries, 
independent courts and a democratic process provide avenues to resolve conflicts, 
but these are missing in China”). 
 94. See Li Jing, Freeze Extended on Demolishing Firms, CHINA DAILY, July 12, 2004, 
at 3 (“The complaints related to demolished homes filed at the Ministry of 
Construction in the first half of [2004] are more than those in all of 2003. . . . In 
the first quarter of this year, the number of complaints tripled the number in the 
same period last year.”). 
 95. Edward Cody, China’s Land Grabs Raise Specter of Popular Unrest, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at A1.  
 96. Jianrong Yu, How Peasants Lose Their Land Ownership?, 2003, 
http://www.ccrs.org.cn. 
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highlights the seriousness of nationwide rent seeking.97  With 
globalization, it is much easier to move capital across borders.  This 
creates an opportunity for corrupted officials to hide their rents 
overseas, making it harder to fight corruption in the financial and 
land sectors. 
Exchanges involving an asymmetric relationship between 
parties usually bring about negative externalities.98  In China’s case, 
land grabbing is likely to plant the seeds of hatred, which may be a 
vehicle for future social unrest.  The clashes between local 
governments and farmers over land grabs may veer into violence 
and riots, particularly when coupled with other political and 
economic shocks. 
In the short run, the weak protection of individual property 
rights may fuel economic growth because it reduces the transaction 
costs of acquiring land, a must for business investment.  But in the 
long run, it may cause profoundly negative consequences.  On the 
economic front, the land-grabbing fever may result in excess 
production capacity and deflation.99  On the political side, it creates 
new powerful political interest groups, which make future reforms 
more difficult.  Peasants deprived of their land often do not have a 
viable alternative livelihood and are therefore more likely to 
organize and fight with the authorities.100 This increasing potential 
 
 97. Some of the recent reports on rent-seeking activities in the banking and 
real estate sectors include illegal land grabs by local governments in Shaanxi and 
the Fujiang and Guangdong Provinces. See Edward Cody, China’s Land Grabs Raise 
Specter of Popular Unrest, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at A1 (Fujiang and Guangdong 
Provinces); Jim Yardley, Farmers Being Moved Aside by China’s Real Estate Boom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1 (Shaanxi).  Yang Xiuzhu, vice chief of the construction 
department of Zhejiang Province, extracted bribes from property developers and 
disappeared.  Peter S. Goodman, From Rags to Riches to Arrests in Booming China, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2003, at E1. Chen Kai, a local government official of Fuzhou, 
Fujian Province, borrowed an estimated fifty million dollars from six state banks 
and provided kickbacks of around five percent of the loans to the lending officers. 
John Pomfret, Chinese Officials Held in Regional Corruption Probe, WASH. POST, Dec. 
17, 2003, at A39.  Shanghai real estate tycoon, Zhou Zhengyi, was implicated in an 
array of illegal loans coupled with default on statutory compensations for 
relocatees whose homes were improperly demolished for redevelopment projects.  
See Miao Ye, Investing in Misery, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 18, 2003, http://www. 
atimes.com/atimes/China/EL18Ad02.html.   
 98. Ravi Kanbur, On Obnoxious Markets, in GLOBALIZATION, CULTURE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF THE MARKET: ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY 39 (2004); see also 
Housing Disparity Highlights Need for Even Playing Field, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 
3, 2006, at 2. 
 99. Lin, supra note 81. 
 100. See William Barnes, Farmers Threaten Land Grab, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
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for conflict may jeopardize social stability, which has been a major 
asset for China’s favorable investment environment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this article was to examine why outside 
investment and growth in China have been so strong, despite the 
existence of a relatively weak de jure property rights system for 
investors.  As a country in transition, China faces many institutional 
constraints including less-defined property rights.  Decentralization 
and globalization have created strong regional competition for 
private capital in China, leading local governments to protect the 
property of private investors. 
Local governments are forced by the market to offer de facto 
protections for investors’ property.  In order to raise revenue and 
provide land to investors, local governments have taken advantage 
of weaknesses in the existing land laws that allow local governments 
to procure land from private individuals for public purposes.101  
Land is being taken at a fraction of its market value for supposed 
public purposes, and then being provided to private investors to 
promote local economic growth.102  Local governments also provide 
favorable tax breaks to investors.103  These protections serve as a 
substitute for the weak formal property rights and legal systems that 
prevail in China, and have helped to fuel rapid economic growth. 
But this behavior imposes a high cost on those individuals who 
lose their land and associated livelihoods.  Forty million farmers 
have already lost land to takings by local governments.104  The legal 
system seems unable to resolve land-taking conflicts when they 
arise, and affected farmers are increasingly organizing to protest 
and petition for change.105  Two possible outcomes seem likely.  
 
Jan. 27, 1999, at 10 (discussing the possibility that farmers may attempt to seize 
national forest land in response to their joblessness, despite opposition from the 
government). 
 101. See supra Part III. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Anthony Harrington, Tax Breaks Aiding Inward Investment, SCOTSMAN 
(Scotland), Nov. 21, 2006, at 7 (“[T]he Chinese government has not been shy 
about using tax incentives to try to direct inward capital flows.”). 
 104. Jim Yardley, Premier Says China Beset by Corruption and Rural Land Issues, 
Mar. 14, 2006, at A5 (“Government studies show that at least 40 million farmers 
have been left landless in recent years, often because of illegal seizures by local 
officials who exploit the current policy.”). 
 105. Housing Disparity Highlights Need for Even Playing Field, supra note 93. 
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The central government could enact additional political reforms to 
grant farmers more secure property rights and to hold local 
governments more accountable for their actions.  Or, more farmers 
will join the army of the landless and a time may come when a 
volcano of hatred toward governments and developers will erupt, 
provoking unmanageable riots and social unrest. 
Social conflict could prove disastrous for China’s continued 
economic growth.  On the positive side, social unrest may also serve 
as a pressure point for political reform.  In the long run, as a 
country gets rich, people tend to demand more secure protections 
for individual property rights.  Whether China can sustain its 
economic growth depends upon its ability to respond to emerging 
conflicts with continuing institutional innovations.  The key is for 
the government to be adaptive enough to navigate the bumpy road 
ahead. 
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TABLE 1. FIRM RESPONSES REGARDING CHINA’S REGULATIONS AND 
JUDICIARY 
 
 
Consistency of 
officials’ interpretation 
of regulations 
Confidence in 
the judiciary 
system 
Brazil  34.0 60.4 
China 66.3 82.5 
India  35.9 70.6 
Indonesia  44.0 59.2 
Philippines 50.9 66.2 
 
The first column of data represents the percentage of firms that 
agreed with the statement: “In general, government officials’ 
interpretations of regulations affecting my establishment are 
consistent and predictable.”  The second column of data represents 
the percentage of firms that agree with the statement: “I am 
confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and 
property rights in business disputes.”106 
 
 106. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 2. BUSINESS INDICATORS FOR SELECT COUNTRIES107 
 
  Brazil China India Indonesia Philippines 
Number of 
procedures 
17 12 11 12 11 
St
ar
ti
ng
 
up
 Duration 
(days) 
152 41 89 151 50 
Registering 
property - 
number of 
procedures 
14 3 6 6 8 
R
eg
is
te
ri
ng
  
pr
op
er
ty
 
Registering 
property - 
time (days) 
42 32 67 33 33 
G
et
ti
ng
  
cr
ed
it
 
Cost to 
create 
collateral 
(% of 
income 
per capita) 
21.4 0 11.3 2.5 8.3 
 
 
 
 
 107. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 3. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION AND FIXED-ASSET INVESTMENT108 
Year 
Per capita  
consumption 
(yuan) 
Fixed-asset 
investment 
(billion yuan) 
1985      437       254  
1986      485       312  
1987      550       379  
1988      693       475  
1989      762       441  
1990      803       452  
1991      896       559  
1992   1,070       808  
1993   1,331    1,307  
1994   1,746    1,704  
1995   2,236    2,002  
1996   2,641    2,291  
1997   2,834    2,494  
1998   2,972    2,841  
1999   3,138    2,985  
2000   3,397    3,292  
2001   3,609    3,721  
2002   3,818    4,350  
2003   4,089   5,557 
 
Annual  
growth rate (%)   13.23   18.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 1. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LAND REVENUE IN CHINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between revenues from land and 
economic development at the county level in 2000.  The horizontal 
axis represents per capita gross output value of agriculture and 
industry. The vertical axis indicates the per capita revenue 
collected from land use.  Both variables are in the logarithmic 
form.109 
 
 
 
 109. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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